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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Equal Protection * Sex Discrimination
Veterans' Preference Statutes
Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978).
A PREFERENCE IS GIVEN to veterans seeking public employment in the
federal government, the states and numerous local governments.1 The
laws vary considerably as to the amount of preference given, ranging from
an absolute preference to preferences in the form of bonus points added
to the veteran's final score in a test for a position.' Courts which have con-
sidered challenges to these laws have upheld their validity. A rational basis
for these laws is generally found on three grounds.' First, they have been
justified as a way of paying a debt of gratitude to those who have served
in the armed services. Second, courts have accepted the claim that the
qualities that veterans are thought to possess, such as courage and habits
of obedience, are valuable qualifications for public servant positions. And
finally, the thought that veterans should be aided in relocation and reassimila-
tion has been accepted.
Historically, the armed services have been predominantly male. The
result has been that the operation of veterans' preferences has placed women
as a class at a particular disadvantage in comparison to men when in
or entering into civil service.' To nullify this stigma, the first successful
challenge to veterans' preference, Feeney v. Massachusetts,' was litigated.
Feeney v. Massachusetts began its journey through the judicial process
by being consolidated with and decided under the case name of Anthony
v. Massachusetts.' Anthony and Feeney were challenges to the Massachu-
setts Veterans' Preference Statute' on the basis of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.8
Four female residents of Massachusetts claimed they had failed to receive
civil service appointments due to the operation of the Veterans' Preference
Statute, in that it had unconstitutionally discriminated against them be-
1 See generally Fleming & Shanor, Veterans' Preference in Public Employment: Unconstitu-
tional Gender Discrimination?, 26 EMoRY LJ. 13 (1977).
2Id. at 16-18.
3 Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Minn. 1972).
4 From 1940 through 1972, the percentage of women in the armed forces never rose above
2%, with the exception of 1945 when the figure was 2.19%. The percentages improved for
1974-76, when the respective figures were 3.12%, 4.01% and 5.13%. Fleming & Shanor,
supra note 1, at 13-14.
5451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978).
6 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976).
7 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 31, § 23 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1973).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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cause of their gender. Historically, women were either excluded from the
armed services or their percentage was severely limited. At the time of the
suit only 2% of Massachusetts veterans were women.'
The Massachusetts statute required that nonveterans, regardless of their
comparative test scores, could not be ranked higher on state civil service
eligibility lists than a veteran who had received a passing icore.' ° The
Anthony suit involved three female attorneys seeking state legal positions.
Two of the women tied for the highest score, while the third woman tied
for the second highest score. However, due to the veterans' preference, they
were ranked 57th or lower on the eligibility list, giving them no chance of
being certified for the nineteen available positions."
Helen B. Feeney was a nonveteran female" who began her employment
with the state in 1963 as a Senior Clerk Stenographer for the Civil Defense
Agency." From 1967 to 1975 she was a Federal Funds and Personnel Co-
ordinator for the same agency. Mrs. Feeney took the civil service examina-
tion three times. In February, 1971, in the examination for the position of
Assistant Secretary, Board of Dental Examiners, she was the second highest
scorer. The veterans' preference caused her to be ranked sixth behind five
male veterans, four of whom scored lower than she. Instead of Mrs. Feeney,
a male veteran with a score of 78.08 was appointed to the position. In
February, 1973, in an examination for the position of Head Administrative
9 415 F. Supp. at 489.
V)The statutory ranking formula requires the following preferences: disabled veterans in
order of their scores; other veterans in order of their scores; widows and widowed mothers
of veterans in order of their scores; all others eligible in order of their scores. Id. at 485.
11 Carol A. Anthony was a provisional appointee who was seeking a position in the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Welfare. Her score on the unassembled examination (rated
in May 1974) was a grade of 94, which tied her for the highest grade of any applicant.
But, because of Veterans' Preference, she was ranked 57th behind 56 male veterans, 54 of
whom had lower scores than she did.
Kathryn Noonan sought a position as counsel on the Labor Relations Committee. She was
informed by its chairperson that her nonveteran status gave her little chance of obtaining
a permanent position. Therefore, she accepted instead a provisional appointment as a Labor
Relations Examiner since no statewide examination was pending for that position. Her position
involved duties and responsibilities of a counsel, but an examiner was a lower grade than a
Counsel I position and she received less pay. Like Anthony, she had received a grade of 94.
Both women were ranked behind at least 56 veterans. With such a ranking, neither woman
would be certified for any of the 19 available positions.
Betty A. Gittes also sought a Counsel I position. On the unassembled examination she
received a grade of 92 which tied her for the second highest score. However, because of
her nonveteran status, she was ranked 103d behind 76 male veterans, 64 of whom received
lower grades than she did. 415 F. Supp. at 490-91.
12 Mrs. Feeney tried to join the armed forces during World War II, but was unable to
do so because she was not 21. The Selective Service law set up different age requirements
for men and women. Feeney met the minimum age requirement for men but not for women.
Feeney's mother refused to grant permission for her daughter to enter the service early. But
for prior sex/age discrimination, Feeney would have been a veteran. Interview with
Helen B. Feeney, All Things Considered, NPR, Radio, Feb. 26, 1979.
13 415 F. Supp. at 491-92.
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Assistant, Solomon Mental Health Center, her grade was 92.32, the
third highest. She was ranked fourteenth behind twelve veterans, all male,
eleven of whom scored lower than Feeney. She would have been certified
for the position but for the veterans' preference. In May, 1974, in an ex-
amination for positions classified as Administrative Assistant, her grade of
87 tied her for seventeenth place. Her final ranking was 70th behind 64
veterans, 63 of whom were male and 50 of whom scored lower than
Feeney. These positions had not been filled because of a court injunction
pending the resolution of the case. In March, 1975, Mrs. Feeney was laid
off from her position in the Civil Defense Agency.'
The claims in the Anthony case were ruled moot because, on April 17,
1975, the Massachusetts legislature amended their general laws" to remove
all appointments for state and municipal legal positions from state civil
service."l As to the Feeney complaint, the pivotal question for the district
court was, "given the legitimate state purpose of assisting veterans, does the
means by which Massachusetts implements that purpose in the area of public
employment unconstitutionally deprive women of their equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment?"' 7 The court found the preference
formula to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.""
Based on more than fifty eligibility lists compiled between 1971 and
1975, the court held that women were deprived of certification for positions
they would have obtained had the veterans' preference not been in force. 19
While a significant percentage of the civil servants in Massachusetts are
women, they were found to occupy the lower status and lower paying job
categories for which men have not traditionally applied.20 The operation of
veterans' preference effectively excluded women from the higher positions
in the state civil service.
While the statute on its face was neutral, its operation was discrimina-
14 ld. at 492.
'5 The legislature enacted ch. 34 of the Acts of 1975, amending ch. 31, § 5 (effective July
16, 1975).
i6 415 F. Supp. at 492.
27 ld. at 496.
18 Id.
19 In every one, the application of veterans' preference, in significant fashion, causes men to
gain places at the expense of women. Moreover, of the approximately 500 men and 1200
women represented on the lists, 38% of the men are veterans while 0.6% of the women
are veterans. And in each of the lists, one or more female eligibles were placed behind
male veterans with lower scores and were thereby deprived of certification opportunity
which, otherwise they would have had.
Id. at 498.
20From 1963 to 1973, 43% of the permanent appointments had been women, but most
of these were appointments of the lower grade positions, generally clerks and secretaries. Id.
Winter, 19791
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tory towards women. 1 The court, nonetheless, would have upheld its con-
stitutionality had it been the only means by which the state could obtain its
legitimate legislative objective of aiding veterans.' However, the court found
that there were alternatives available to the state, and that the alternatives
would not have such a significant and permanent impact on women as a
class.23 If a state decides to provide civil service jobs, then the fourteenth
amendment requires that it be done in a nondiscriminatory manner. Here,
women had virtually no opportunity to gain high level positions due to
circumstances beyond their control.
While the objective of the policy was legitimate and rational, the court
insisted that the means to that end must also be legitimate and rational."
But the veterans' preference did not contain any criteria that related to the
demands of particular jobs. The absolute preference given to veterans could
not be sustained when it operated to the detriment of another identifiable
class, women.
The State Attorney General appealed the Anthony decision to the
United States Supreme Court." The Court vacated the judgment and re-
manded26 with instructions to reconsider the decision in light of Washington
v. Davis," that case having been decided after Anthony.
Davis had challenged the validity of a written personnel test, Test 21,
used by the District of Columbia Police Department and developed by the
Civil Service Commission to test verbal skills. Plaintiffs argued that the test
was not related to job required skills and it had a discriminatory effect by
screening out a disproportionate number of black candidates. 8 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied the standard of Griggs v.
21 "Facially, the Veterans' Preference is open to both men and women. But to say that it
provides an equal opportunity for both men and women to achieve a preference would be
to ignore reality." Id. For other cases in which the Court found operational discrimination
based on facial neutrality, see Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584 (1958); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886).
22 415 F. Supp. at 499.
23 As alternatives to the absolute preference the court suggested the use of a point system
to provide "some reward" for length of service or to recognize specific skills or to set a
time limit for exercising the preference. Id.
24 1d. at 498-99.
25 The Attorney General filed the appeal without the authorization of either the Massachusetts
Personnel Administrator or the Civil Service Commission. These were the state agencies
against whom the district court's judgment was entered. The Governor requested that an
appeal not be taken from the judgment. By its own motion, the Supreme Court certified
the question of whether state law allowed such appeals without the consent of the state
officials against whom the judgment was entered. Ques. certified sub nom. Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976).
2698 S. Ct. 252 (1977).
27 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28 Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972).
[Vol. 12:3
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Duke Power Co.,2" using Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a
basis for the decision. The court held that disproportionate impact by itself
was sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, and that legislative
intent in designing or administering the test was irrelevant."
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals had
erred in applying legal standards applicable to a Title VII case in resolving
a fifth amendment issue and in being unconcerned with discriminatory pur-
pose or intent. 1
In a later decision, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,32 the Supreme Court elaborated further on the criteria
of Davis. Both cases were challenges based on claims of racial discrimina-
tion."3 An integration of both would be required in the reconsideration of
Feeney by the district court.
Davis required a finding of legislative intent to discriminate," while
Anthony had assumed that a finding of disparate impact was sufficient to
prove discrimination. However, Davis held that a disproportionate impact
was not enough to justify an equal protection challenge on either fifth or
fourteenth amendment grounds.3 Discriminatory purpose or intent had to
be present, but it did not have to be expressed; it could instead be determined
by the totality of the circumstances.3 Justice Stevens, in his concurring
opinion in Washington v. Davis, amplified this point:
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing
the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is
presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This
is particularly true in the case of governmental action which is fre-
quently the product of compromise, of collective decision-making,
and of mixed motivation.37
Reconsidering in light of Davis, the district court again found in favor
20401 U.S. 424 (1971).
30 Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 960 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
317rTe parties in Davis had not challenged the applicability of Griggs. Their dispute was
over whether it was being misapplied. The Court used the doctrine of "plain error" to take
note of this ground for reversal. 426 U.S. at 238 n.12.
32429 U.S. 252 (1977).
33In Arlington Heights, plaintiffs claimed that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminatod
against racial minorities. Plaintiffs were seeking rezoning from single family to multiple
family dwellings.
34 426 U.S. at 239-40.
35 Id. at 239.
36 1d. at 242.
37 426 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Winter, 1979]
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of Feeney. 8 The decision was based on the long-standing federal policy
limiting the number of women in the armed services to 2%, the result being
that only 2% of Massachusetts' veterans are women. 9 Thus, few women
could become veterans and thereby qualify for the preference. The district
court distinguished Feeney from Davis on their entirely different factual
situations."° The Veterans' Preference Statute did not constitute an impartial
,selection policy." Feeney was not challenging the written civil service exami-
nation, as was the case in Davis, but the ranking formula of the Veterans' Pref-
erence Statute, which required preference be given to veterans who had
passed the examination over nonveterans no matter what their comparative
scores.
In analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the majority found that
the state policy had the natural, foreseeable and inevitable consequence of
producing a discriminatory impact on women.' While the statute was facial-
ly neutral, the court held that "[t]he legislature was, at the least, chargeable
with knowlege of the long-standing federal regulations limiting opportunities
for women in the military, and the inevitable discriminatory consequences
produced by their application to the challenged formula.""
The district court found that the absolute and permanent veterans' pref-
erence had a devastating impact on women's chances for competitive civil
service positions." This factual situation was different from that in Davis
where the District of Columbia had made affirmative efforts to recruit blacks
for the police force." Indeed, 44% of the new recruits over the preceding
three years had been blacks, a figure that was close to the proportion of
blacks in the area." While the state of Massachusetts tried to claim that
the 57-43 proportion of men to women was not an adverse one, the court
found the figure to be a misleading one because women were concentrated
in the lower grade positions. "7 The laudable legislative objective of bene-
asFeeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (1978). The claims brought by the plaintiffs
in Anthony v. Massachusetts were rendered moot when, in April, 1975, the state legislature
removed all appointments of state and municipal attorneys from the civil service law. See
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 31, § 5.
39 451 F. Supp. at 145.
401 d. at 147-49.
41 The court believed that the preference was not neutral because it was based on "decades
of restrictive federal enlistment regulations" which disfavored women. 415 F. Supp. at 495.
But the court, in reaching this conclusion, relied upon one of the cases, Castro v. Beecher,
disfavored in Davis. See note 55 infra.
42 451 F. Supp. at 147.
' s d. at 148.
"[d. at 148-49.
45 426 U.S. at 246.
*old. at 235.
7 451 F. Supp. at 149.
[Vol. 12:3
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fiting veterans could not be permitted by sacrificing the careers of women.
And since there were less drastic alternatives available to the state to achieve
its purpose, the absolute and permanent veteran preference was constitution-
ally impermissible.4s
The opinion in Anthony v. Massachusetts has been described as "the
ruminations of a liberal court searching for a theory that would disallow
a seemingly socially outrageous result." 9 Anthony departed both from the
prevailing holdings and the prevailing standards. The plaintiffs' failure to
demonstrate that the statute was based on sex-role stereotypes meant that
the applicable standard should have been the rational relationship test."
Thus a stricter standard was imposed in Anthony than that used in Davis
or the intermediate scrutiny standard which is applied if there is a showing
of sex-role stereotypes. 1 There also appears to be confusion in the court's
analysis of the type of discrimination before them. The failure to distinguish
between de facto and de jure discrimination has resulted in a lack of clarity
as to the appropriate standard.52 The court's difficulties are symptomatic of
the varied and frequently unclear standards that have recently developed
regarding equal protection.5
The standard to be applied in Feeney, that used in Davis, represents
a rejection of the trend which had allowed a "wholesale importation" of
Title VII criteria into fourteenth amendment cases. Title VII did not protect
public employees until 1972." From 1964 to 1972, Title VII-type com-
plaints were brought by public employees as constitutional cases under 42
U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1983."5 Under Title VII it was not necessary to
"The court in Anthony suggested a point system or time limits for exercising the preferences
as more flexible alternatives to the absolute state preference. 415 F. Supp. at 499.
49 Blumberg, DeFacto and DeJure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: A
Reconsideration of the Veterans' Preference in Public Employment, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 3,
71 (1976).
50 For a lengthier discussion of the problems with the Anthony decision, see Note, 23 WAYNE
Sr. L. REv. 1435 (1977).
52 Strict scrutiny is applied for the suspect classification of race and alienage. The majority
of the Supreme Court has failed to categorize sex as suspect. It is given only intermediate
scrutiny. The least scrutiny is employed in the rational relation test where there is a pre-
sumption of validity if the statute bears a rational relation to a valid legislative purpose.
62Blumberg, supra note 49, at 78-79.
53 Dissatisfaction with the two-tiered equal protection approach, strict versus minimal scrutiny,
is evident with the Burger Court. But the Court has not yet delineated the intermediate
test. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
For A New Equal Protection, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards
of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classi-fications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Note, Wis. L. REv. 330 (1976).
" The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 83 Stat.
103, which amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, added public employees to its coverage.
65 Approval of the application of the relaxed criteria can be found in Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459
F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
Winter, 19791
7
Taylor: Feeney v. Massachusetts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979
AKRON LAW REVIEW
prove a discriminatory purpose; disproportionate impact was enough. The
Court in Davis refused to extend that legislative standard to fifth or four-
teenth amendment cases. They felt such an extension "should await legisla-
tive prescription.""
Indeed, the Court indicated that it was in disagreement with numerous
other lower court decisions"7 that had held it was not necessary to prove
discriminatory purpose in order to have an equal protection violation.5" So,
after Davis, discriminatory intent or purpose needs to be proved in equal
protection cases before stricter scrutiny will be triggered. 9
But the subjects most likely to fall under the Davis standard seem to
be veterans' preference, urban renewal, zoning, and public housing.60 Em-
ployment cases will use alternate grounds since:
[t]he Court's repudiation of the sui generis approach to constitutionally
based challenges to government employment practices does not have
broad ramifications in that particular area, because Title VII coverage
has been extended to federal, state, and municipal government em-
ployees by the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972. For most fair employ-
ment litigants challenging facially neutral employment criteria, Wash-
ington v. Davis simply means that greater efforts will have to be made
to comply with Title VII procedural requirements. The decision is,
however, important with regard to state veterans' preferences which
are specifically excluded from the reach of Title VII.61
Davis appears to require affirmative answers to two questions before a
statute can be invalidated on equal protection grounds.6" First, there must be
a determination of whether a statute is discriminatory. If the discrimination
is not facially apparent, then intent to discriminate must be found. Secondly,
it must be ascertained whether the intent is invidious or impermissibly dis-
criminatory. However, the requirements to support intent are far from
clear, even after elaboration in Arlington Heights.
Other challenges to veterans' preference on the basis of sex discrimi-
"Until the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Davis, explicitly rejected the wholesale impor-
tation of Title VII into the Fourteenth Amendment, it seemed to sanction this development.
Castro and Chance are twice cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."
Blumberg, supra note 49, at 22.
51 426 U.S. at 248.
57 See 426 U.S. at 244 n.12.
5 8 1 d. at 242-45.
59 Id. at 240.
60 Blumberg, supra note 49, at 34.
61 id. at 34.
62 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 24-25.
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nation have been unsuccessful. In Feinerman v. Jones,63 the court did not
use a heightened standard of scrutiny,"4 nor did it find anything on the record
to indicate a harsh adverse impact of the veterans' preference on women."
Women there constituted 48% of the state work force and there was no
statistical breakdown submitted to the court for particular job categories
to demonstrate discrimination.6"
In Koelfgen v. Jackson,6 the court avoided confronting the issue of
the impact on women. Women were found to be just one of ten classes
claiming to be disadvantaged because of the operation of veterans' prefer-
ence." The various plaintiffs were consolidated into one manageable class,
and the court merely applied the rational basis criteria in making its decision.
The plaintiffs had not convinced the court that public employment was a
fundamental right so as to require stricter scrutiny. 9 Plaintiffs were also
unable to prove that promotional preference for veterans was irrational."0
Lacking sufficient proof to warrant closer scrutiny, the court never got to
the question of sex discrimination.
Branch v. DuBois," decided after Anthony and Davis, unanimously
upheld the veterans' preference statute.' The court found no legislative intent
to discriminate; any disadvantage suffered was only incidental to the valid
legislative purpose of rewarding veterans. The court reasoned that Davis
required invidious discrimination in order to trigger stricter scrutiny. 3 Find-
ing none, the rational basis test was applied. The case was distinguished
from Anthony by finding that the Illinois statute was not an absolute pref-
erence like the one in Massachusetts; the Illinois statute and its "use of pref-
erence points hinders the advancement of women but does not preclude it."'"
63356 F. Supp. 253 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
6The arguments employed to activate stricter scrutiny were not found to be persuasive.
Feinerman was claiming that the right to be considered for public employment was a funda-
mental right. The court rejected this argument because they said public employment has
never been recognized as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff's argument
that there was no rational relation between military training and civil service was rejected on
two grounds. Feinerman did not show the reward for military service was irrational nor did
she show that "military training does not prepare veterans to be better qualified to perform
public duties." Id. at 256-60.
65 Id. at 261.
66 "Plaintiff has not made any showing of how many women have been deprived of positions
because of a lack of veterans' preference, nor has she shown how many men have received
their jobs because of veterans' preference." Id.
67 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972).
68 For a listing of the classes represented, see 355 F. Supp. at 247 n.3.
GOld. at 250-52.
TO Id. at 254.
72418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976).





Taylor: Feeney v. Massachusetts
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979
AKRON LAw REVIEW
Ballou v. State Department of Civil Service75 also represents a post
Davis and Anthony challenge to veterans' preference based on claimed sex
discrimination. Ballou contended that the law had a discriminatory impact
on women because 98% of the armed forces were men."8 Relying on Davis
and Arlington Heights, the court upheld the state law because the dispro-
portionate impact argument was not sufficient to activate strict scrutiny in
the absence of a claim of discriminatory purpose. '
Other decisions applicable to Feeney include those dealing with sex-
role stereotypes. An intermediate level of scrutiny as to gender discrimination
will be applied if discriminatory intent is found as required by Davis. The
invidious discriminatory purpose of Davis, as applied to a sex discrimination
case, would mean an inquiry into whether the statute perpetuates gender
discrimination. The major cases on this subject"8 seem to indicate that a sex
discriminatory classification will violate the Equal Protection Clause when
the following two conditions are met: "first, if the statute reflects insensi-
tivity to the attempts of some women to break out of traditional female roles,
and second, if the gender discrimination is unnecessary to the achievement
of the underlying purpose of the entire statute.""
The Court in these cases has not formulated anything that amounts to
a precise standard relating to gender discrimination. It appears to have taken
an ad hoc approach. However, when reviewed together, the cases reveal "a
pattern in which certain factors relevant to challenges to veterans' prefer-
ences have been consistently treated. Official gender discrimination is likely
to be disallowed as 'invidious' if it disfavors women in employment oppor-
tunities, particularly when the discrimination has no more justification than
archaic and overbroad assumptions about gender roles.""0
For a successful challenge to veterans' preference based on sex dis-
crimination, the key appears to be the amount of evidence that the plaintiff
75 148 NJ. Super. 112, 372 A.2d 333 (1977), affd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978).
16 148 NJ. Super. at 124, 372 A.2d at 339.
"7 Ballou's argument relied upon Anthony for support for a finding of discriminatory impact.
But the court found that her argument was undercut because of the following Civil Service
Commission finding:
Although women constitute a large integral group within the total population of non-
veterans, there was not sufficient evidence to prove that women are discriminated against
by the veterans' preference to any substantially greater degree than are all non-veterans.
The system works to the disadvantage of all non-veterans, including women, who happen
to be a very predominant group of non-veterans.
Id.
78 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
79 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 39-40.
80 Id. at 42.
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is able to bring forth.8 But the hurdle of showing intent to discriminate as
required by Washington v. Davis is a substantial one."' Recent case law
has made it more difficult to prove discrimination.8 3
Attention has to be focused on constitutional standards because no
federal statute exists for invalidating veterans' preference statutes.8 " Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act exempts these statutes from coverage.
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal or modify
any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating special rights or prefer-
ences for veterans."'" Likewise, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 applies to racial
but not gender discrimination cases.
While Feeney must rest on recent case law, the decision should have
limited impact in other areas of claimed discrimination. Statutory standards
could still be utilized for other cases of discrimination.
Feeney represents the first major chink in the armor of veterans' pref-
erence. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider
the question of whether the Massachusetts preference violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Additionally, there exists a ser-
ies of unresolved issues that may or may not be resolved by the Court. They
include: (a) How does one measure intent to discriminate?" (b) Are vet-
erans' preferences based on sex role stereotypes? (c) Can the distinctions
drawn between Feeney and Davis be persuasive to the Court? (d) Can a
stricter standard of scrutiny be applied to even a "facially neutral" statute?
The future significance of this case will be determined by which of the many
8 lThe factual situation in Feeney appears to be stronger than in the other four cases dis-
cussed. Koelfgen did not reach the question. Feinerman was not able to statistically substanti-
ate sex discrimination. 356 F. Supp. at 261. The evidence in Ballou was undercut by con-
trary findings of the Civil Service Commission. See note 77 supra. In Branch, while there
was evidence of an adverse impact on women, the situation was not as severe as in Feeney.
Emphasizing the extreme nature of the preference in Feeney, both the Branch and Ballou
courts distinguished the facts in their cases from Feeney. See 418 F. Supp. at 1132; 148
N.J. Super. at 123, 372 A.2d at 338-89.
Bannerman v. Department of Youth Authority, 436 F. Supp. 1273 (1977), was another
unsuccessful equal protection challenge to veterans' preference. Neither intent to discriminate
nor discriminatory effect was proven. 436 F. Supp. at 1280-81.
82 The Court itself recognized that less proof was required in a Title VII violation than
in a fifth or fourteenth amendment case. 426 U.S. at 247-48.
83See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Harwood v. Harwood, - R.I.
385 A.2d 1055 (1978); Note, 46 U. Mo. KANSAS CrrY L. REv. 133 (1977).
84 Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 15-16 n.9.
s542 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-11 (1970). Fleming and Shanor argue that Title VII might be in-
voked "to prevent a private employer from utilizing a private veterans' preference not
mandated by state or federal law." Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 16 n.9.
8647 U.S.L.W. 3239 (Oct. 10, 1978).
8 7 Washington v. Davis left open the possibility that disproportionate impact may provide
evidence of intent. See Comment, Veterans' Public Employment Preference as Sex Discrimi-
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avenues of approach available to the Court it chooses to utilize. The follow-
ing approaches seem the most probable alternatives available to the Court.
First, it could distinguish Feeney from Davis as did the Massachusetts
district court and invalidate the absolute preference given to veterans. This
approach would impact on the six other states having absolute preference
similar to Massachusetts,8 and possibly on the other states as well as the
federal government which give absolute preference only to some positions
or for disabled veterans. Upholding Feeney would leave intact the approaches
of the other states and the federal government which, for most positions,
give only some preference to veterans applying for civil service positions.
But the Massachusetts preference is not only absolute but also is a lifetime
preference. The striking down of the lifetime preference could have ramifi-
cations in those states which do not have an absolute preference but do
have a lifetime preference.
Secondly, the Court could go further than Feeney and declare that
veterans' preferences, whether absolute or preferential, must be struck down
because their detrimental effect on job opportunities for women perpetuates
sex-role stereotypes. Bonus points given to veterans would, in most cases,
produce the same result as application of the absolute preference. Women
seeking upper echelon civil service positions would benefit only if the entire
system of preference were struck down or a separate preference system were
instituted to aid them.
Thirdly, the Court could decide to overturn Feeney and uphold vet-
erans' preference in Massachusetts. It could do so by giving only the most
cursory examination of intent or "totality of the circumstances" and look
primarily at legislative intent, thereby finding no discrimination. The over-
whelming majority of the courts have taken this approach in validating
veteran preference statutes and appear to take the two-tiered approach to
equal protection. Such a conclusion would be much more difficult in
Feeney because the statistical evidence compiled is more extensive than
that presented in other cases.89 Additionally, the kind of preference is more
extreme here than in the majority of the states or federal governments."
It would also be fairly easy for the Court to find the situation in Feeney dis-
tinguishable from Davis without any erosion of the more stringent standards
for proving discrimination imposed by that case.
88Those six are New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 17 n.13.
89 See note 82, supra.
90 The majority of the states and the federal government have statutes that give veterans
point preferences on civil service examinations rather than the absolute ranking preference
of Massachusetts. Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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It also seems rather difficult for the Court to sustain such an absolute
preference for veterans in light of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,9 which disallowed such preference for the sixteen slots set aside for
minority admissions into the Davis Medical School. Feeney could serve as
a basis for further elaboration and definition of the Court's decision in
Bakke. It is unlikely that the Court will take that route because Bakke was
essentially a Title VI case, while Feeney rests on fourteenth amendment
grounds. The district court in Feeney was careful to point out that its de-
cision did not rest on the standards applicable to Title VII cases. - The
concern was present because of its confusion of standards evident in the
earlier Anthony decision. Likewise, the Supreme Court in Davis had been
careful to make distinctions between statutory and constitutional standards
in not allowing a Title VII standard to apply to a fifth amendment case. It
is thus highly unlikely that the Court will use the fourteenth amendment
case Of Feeney to elaborate on the Title VI case of Bakke.
It is, of course, possible that Feeney could be utilized to firmly reiterate
the Court's concern that women be treated so as to give them fair oppor-
tunity in the job market. But real opportunity for women would require
the Court to strike down all veterans' preference statutes. The Court is un-
likely to go that far. The facts of the Feeney case do not require them to
do so; they need only deal with the more extreme type of veterans' pref-
erence. The recently decided Bakke case permitted some preference be
allowed to minorities. Given the disparate views in Bakke, it is hard to de-
termine what is permissible and what is not. Justice Blackmun informs us
of at least his stand on preferences:
It is worth noting, perhaps, that governmental preference has not been
a stranger to our legal life. We see it in veterans' preferences. We see it
in the aid-to-the-handicapped programs. We see it in the progressive
income tax. We see it in Indian programs. We may excuse some of these
on the ground that they have specific constitutional protection or, as
with Indians, that those benefited are wards of the Government. Never-
theless, these preferences exist and may not be ignored.93
The Court probably will take the middle road in Feeney, as it did in
Bakke. They will choose to distinguish Feeney from Davis and rule the
absolute preference invalid. They will, however, continue to allow the states
and the federal government to employ less extreme methods of aiding or
rewarding veterans as being well within governments' legitimate legislative
authority. In so holding, though striking down a sexually discriminatory
practice, the case would not substantially enhance the prospects for women
9198 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
92 451 F. Supp. at 148.
93 98 S. Ct. at 2808.
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obtaining jobs in civil service. On the other hand, veterans would continue
to reap the rewards of the system. The retention of some preference to
veterans would continue to serve as a substantial hindrance to women seeking
the traditionally non-female positions. Their gain would only be the removal
of the absolute bar.
Nonetheless, Feeney could represent a departure from the Court's recent
approach in Davis, Arlington Heights and Geduldig to facially neutral stat-
utes. Justice White, writing for the majority in Davis, did not preclude the
possibility of finding discrimination in the application of a facially neutral
statute. "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be in-
ferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true,
that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."9 The factual
situation in Feeney provides the Court with an excellent opportunity to do so.
One of the difficulties with Anthony which has been carried over to
Feeney was a failure of plaintiffs to show and for the court to discuss ade-
quately sex-role stereotypes. Assuming the Feeney decision can survive the
initial Davis hurdle of showing intent to discriminate, an intermediate level
of scrutiny thereby brought into play needs sex-role stereotypes in order to
find gender based discrimination.95 Feeney could survive the initial test of
finding the impermissible legislative intent and still fail because of insufficient
proof of gender based discrimination. The discrimination could be justified
in terms of some legitimate legislative purpose which overrides the discrimi-
natory one. 6 The court obliquely addresses this question in discussing the
legislative intent to benefit veterans at the expense of women."' The cursory
treatment of sex role stereotypes may not be fatal but it is debilitating when
the district court is trying to argue for application of a stricter standard in
the case of a facially neutral statute, something not yet accepted, without
adequately discussing the standard.
There are also difficulties with the court's finding of discriminatory
legislative intent. This is not entirely of their own doing, since the definition
of that standard is unclear in both Davis and Arlington Heights. It is clear
that the Court would permit an investigation of the totality of the circum-
stances in reaching such a conclusion. But whether the Court will accept the
94 426 U.S. at 242.
95 An intermediate scrutiny standard was applied by the majority in Anthony. 415 F. Supp.
at 195-99. But intent was not considered as mandated by Davis.
96 See Note, supra note 50, at 1448-51.
97 Its only explicit mention of sex-role stereotypes is contained in a footnote discussing the
legislative history of the preference. The court found that state law permitted a practice
of requesting only women for certain positions thus suspending the operation of veterans'
preference. This provision was repealed in 1971 but "[s]tatistics show that the exemption
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notion that actors are presumed to intend the consequences of their actions
articulated by Justice Stevens in Davis and accepted by the majority in
Feeney is another question. The tort standard seems somewhat strained when
applied to legislative politics abounding in its variety of purposes and bar-
gains. But the foreseeability of the result is one way to attempt to demon-
strate that there was an intent to discriminate. Generally, it will probably
be the only proof available.9" Whether the Court will be persuaded that the
legislature knew or should have known its actions would cause discrimination
probably depends on how likely it is that the presumption is correct99 or how
invidious the discrimination might be.
By way of support, the Feeney case is on much firmer ground than
Davis. The evidence of discriminatory impact was more extensively docu-
mented. There had been no governmental affirmative action program in
Massachusetts, as had been the case in Davis. In a compilation of fifty cer-
tification lists, veterans' preference had excluded women from effective com-
petition. Women in the state civil service were concentrated in the secretarial
and clerical positions.
If policy considerations are important to the Court, there is political
support for limiting veterans' preference in both the state and national
government. In Massachusetts, the governor as well as the two state officials
affected by the Anthony decision did not want an appeal from the case
taken."° The Carter Administration has supported reform of the federal
civil service law to limit veterans' preference. The motive behind the reform
was to improve the quality of the civil service by employing more job re-
lated criteria to choose employees. However, many of the suggested reforms
were lost in a last minute flurry of lobbying activity by the veterans groups.
Finally, Bakke represents at least symbolic support for Feeney and the
idea that qualified persons should not be excluded because of the operation
of some quota or absolute preference.
Feeney can and should be upheld. The impact on a disadvantaged class
in Feeney is much more pronounced than in either Davis or Arlington
Heights. The absolute preference given to veterans starkly delineates the
discriminatory effect on women who have been concentrated in the lower
level positions. Such statutes clearly perpetuate the sex-role stereotypes al-
ready condemned by the Court.
ELOIsE TAYLOR
98 See Blumberg, supra note 49, at 44.
90 Id. at 45.
100 See note 25, supra.
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